

A Sybil-Resistant Admission Control Coupling SybilGuard with Distributed Certification

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What is the Sybil Attack ?


Honest network

- 1 Each user generates a random unique identifier
- 2 These identifiers are uniformly distributed


Network under Sybil Attack

- 1 An attacker *chooses* many identifiers
- 2 This attacker corrupts the uniform distribution


Routing Table of a Node (Chord)




Global Attack



Attack of a Resource: Censorship



Attack of a Node: Filtering



Limiting the Sybil Attack

Limiting the Sybil Attack requires to

- **Limit** the number of identifiers of each physical person
- **Constrain** these identifiers to be randomly chosen

In our proposition

- Number of identifiers is limited using social SybilGuard
- Random identifiers are hashed from certificates

Related Work

Crypto-puzzles

Huge disparities among users

Social protections (SybilGuard)

No constraints on node identifiers

Certification Authorities

Expensive and centralized

⇒ Combination of Social and CA

Outline

- 1 Presentation of the two Combined Sybil Protections
- 2 Combination of SybilGuard with Distributed Certification

Presentation of the two Combined Sybil Protections

SybilGuard: a Social-Based Protection


Principle

- Each member manually creates edges to friends
- Each member automatically creates random convergent routes
- A member accepts another one if routes intersect


For us...

A "simple" oracle for sybil-detection


Example




Example



Example



Example



Strengths & Weaknesses

Strengths

- Social-based sybil protection
- Easy deployment

Weaknesses

- No control on the node identifier

Certification Authorities

Principle

- Each member registers with the CA
- The CA checks the identity of newcomers
- A genuine newcomer receives a signed membership certificate

Strengths

- Truly random node identifiers

Weaknesses

- Hard deployment
- Associated cost
- Contrary to P2P philosophy

Combining SybilGuard and CA

Two functionalities in a CA

- Deciding whether to accept the newcomer
- Signing his certificate

Combining SybilGuard and CA

Two functionalities in a CA

- Deciding whether to accept the newcomer
⇒ SybilGuard on each node (social cost, easy deployment)
- Signing his certificate
⇒ Distributed certification (truly random node identifiers)

Combination of SybilGuard with Distributed Certification


Distributed Admission Control

Principle


- Membership is proved by a certificate
- Signature of this certificate requires the cooperation of $t\%$ of the nodes
- Each node cooperates if its SybilGuard detects the newcomer as genuine
- Node identifier is derived from the certificate (unpredictable)

⇒ A newcomer obtains his certificate only if $t\%$ of the nodes detect him as genuine


Example




Example




Example




Example



Example



Example



Results

10,000 nodes, SybilGuard alone

- $w = 45$ to accept every honest node
- 67 sybil nodes per attacker

10,000 nodes, SybilGuard with Distributed Certification

- $w = 37$ to accept every honest node
- 38 sybil nodes per attacker

Conclusion and Future Work

Conclusion

- Social-based sybil protection
- Random node identifiers
- Less sybil nodes than SybilGuard alone
- Theoretical analysis with constant degrees

Future Work

- Theoretical analysis with distribution of degrees
- Optimizations and deployment on PlanetLab
- Simulations on real social networks ?

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